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The Political Economy of Congressional 




Old Dominion University 
Beginning in the early 1980s, the U.S. Government reformed the patent law in ways that made patents 
easier to acquire and defend, but further efforts to expand the rights of patent owners had stalled by the 
mid-1990s. I use a political economy model to explain these changes in terms of the shifting 
constituency interests represented by members of the U.S. Congress. As the distribution of patenting 
became less skewed in the 1980s, more members represented constituencies likely to benefit from 
inefficient patent policy. But as the distribution of patent holding became more skewed once again in the 
later 1990s, support for expansions of patent rights decreased.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The first decade of the 21st century saw a heated debate over whether patents 
provide effective (Chen, 2008) or ineffective (Bessen and Meurer, 2008; Hunt, 2006) 
incentives for innovation, and whether patent rights had grown too strong (Jaffe 
and Lerner, 2004:25-26) or not (Denicolò, 2007). Often ignored in this debate was the 
question of how political interests influence the design of patent policy. This 
paper focuses on how the district-level interests represented by members of the 
U.S. Congress influence their patent-policy votes, and it examines how the 
resultant incentives to balance public and private patent interests have shifted 
over time. Changes in the micro-level incentives of members of Congress 
appear to explain macro-level changes in U.S. patent policy. 
In conjunction with the technical challenges of designing an effective patent 
system (Encaoua, Guellec, and Martínez, 2006; Shapiro, 2007), there are political challenges 
(Nard and Morriss, 2006). This paper examines U.S. patent policy from a political 
economy perspective. I argue that when legislators make patent policy, they 
                                                 
* My thinking on this topic benefitted greatly from conversations with William Keech, Greg 
Adams and Wes Cohen.  
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weigh both public and private constituency-level benefits.1 Therefore, members 
of Congress from districts with large numbers of patent owners will at times 
have an interest in backing patent policies in which public benefits are 
swamped by public costs, simply because their district will be able to leverage 
its large patent portfolio to extract rents from other parts of the country or 
world (Scotchmer, 2004). This can explain why members of Congress in the 1980s 
and early 1990s would rationally choose to implement policies that arguably 
degraded the quality of U.S. patents (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004), and then pull back 
from further movement in that direction by the late 1990s. District-level patent 
interests strongly influence votes, and there is evidence that changes in the 
distribution of district-level interests help shape changes in U.S. patent policy.  
2. LITERATURE 
The 1980s and the early 1990s brought major expansions in the availability, 
length, enforceability, and number of patents issued in the United States.2 Why 
were patents made more broadly available, as well as longer, stronger, and 
easier to get? Did these reforms serve the public interest, or the private 
interests of patent owners, or both? Several arguments have been advanced to 
explain patent policy changes, but all have substantial weaknesses.  
Some authors have argued that changes in patent policy resulted from policy 
‘capture’ by powerful interests (e.g. Kahin, 2001). However, the evidentiary base 
for these arguments is generally very thin. Capture is often asserted without 
citation or evidence (e.g. Encaoua, Guellec, and Martínez, 2006), and whether capture 
explains the policy changes is disputed by Kortum and Lerner (1999).  
Alternately, some argue that policy changes may have been driven by the notion 
that patent law changes were in the public interest, with any resultant inefficiency 
the result of negative unanticipated consequences (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). In the 
1980s, a key intellectual impetus for reform came from efforts to preserve the 
position of U.S. corporations in world competition.3 However Scherer (2007) 
argues that this alone cannot account for the patent law changes, given the 
weak evidence that strengthening patent laws would provide a public good. 
                                                 
1 Patents provide private gains for the recipient (provided the patent can be exploited) and impose 
public costs such as higher costs for use of the invention and potential hold-up of related inventions 
(Choi, 2005). In return, patent systems arguably provide a public good by spurring innovation. 
2 Major changes (see Jaffe and Lerner, 2004) include: the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act; the creation of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982; the 1984 Hatch-Waxman act; Patent Office 
budget changes in 1991; and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
implementation of the Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) in 1993, including 
extension of many pharmaceutical patents. 
3 Wes Cohen, in a 2001 private conversation. See also, Scotchmer, 2004.  
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Furthermore, if the negative consequences of reform were unanticipated (Jaffe 
and Lerner, 2004), a public-spirited account cannot explain the failure to redress 
them. A public-spirited account also cannot explain why Congress voted to 
extend a number of pharmaceutical patents in the late 1980s when it had not 
voted on such an extension for 90 years: the extension provided rents for 
patent owners without any direct public benefit. A purely public-spirited 
account of congressional action (even with a role for unanticipated 
consequences) is inadequate.  
3. THEORY 
A fundamental assumption of this analysis is that lawmakers representing each 
district or state will vote for intellectual property protections if they believe that 
these protections will make their constituents better off, and will vote against 
intellectual property protections if they believe that the protections will make 
their constituents worse off. In evaluating the effect of patent protection on their 
constituents, legislators will consider the public benefits of patents (e.g., 
encouraging innovation and national welfare), as well as whether their district will 
derive private benefits or pay private costs as a result of changes in patent policy.  
When it comes to district interests, one important factor is the degree to 
which constituents hold patents relative to residents of other parts of the 
country. Some constituencies benefit a great deal from patents that provide 
positive returns (Hall, 2005) because they have many patent owners relative to 
their patent-related costs while some constituencies have very few patent 
owners to offset patent-related costs. Representatives of states or districts 
with more to gain are more likely to vote to make patents easier to acquire 
and defend.  
Hypothesis 1: Legislators from states or districts with relatively more patent holdings 
should be more likely to support policy changes that increase the returns for patent 
holders (even changes that have little public benefit). 
The distribution of patents across districts has implications not only for 
specific votes, but also for the broader pattern of policy changes. At some 
points in history, patent awards have been more geographically concentrated 
than at other points. When patent ownership is geographically concentrated, 
then a few states or districts will have strong patent portfolios that will provide 
their representatives with “pro-patent” voting incentives, while most will not. 
Conversely, when many districts or states have somewhat above average patent 
holdings, then a much larger number of representatives will have incentives to 
cast “pro-patent” votes.  
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Hypothesis 2: National policy will shift towards the expansion of patent holders’ 
rights when many states or districts have above average patent holdings, and away 
from an expansion of patent holders’ rights when few states or districts have above 
average patent holdings.  
The degree to which expansions of patent rights provide public benefits that 
exceed their costs should condition the intercept in the relationships described 
above. If a particular expansion of patent rights will impose more costs than 
benefits, then even states or districts with very strong patent holdings may have 
an incentive to restrict patent holders’ rights. On the other hand, policy 
changes that provide broad public benefits with few costs might be expected to 
attract support even from regions with few patents.  
In the analysis below I also control for several other variables likely to 
influence legislator votes on patent policy: party affiliation, member ideology, 
and manufacturing employment.  
4. DATA 
If the hypotheses developed above are correct, then we should find more 
support for the interests of patent owners among those members of Congress 
representing districts with above-average patenting. This section tests that 
assumption using all twelve non-unanimous roll call votes on patent policy 
taken in the Senate and the 17 non-unanimous roll call votes taken in the 
House of Representatives from 1965 through 2000. The dependent variable is 
a vote in favor of expanded patent protection. In this period, the Congress 
considered a variety of questions ranging from creation of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (which gained nation-wide appellate jurisdiction 
over patents and used it to make them more broadly available and easier to 
defend), to the extension of particular patents and changes in the term length 
available for patents.  
The main independent variable in this analysis is the difference between the 
number of patents per person awarded in a state and the average number per 
person nationally. As discussed above, states with above average patent 
holdings should be more likely to benefit from expansions of patent holders’ 
rights, while states with below average patent holdings should be more likely to 
suffer from such expansions, with the specific intercept determined by the 
public benefits (or costs) expected to arise as a result of the legislation. Because 
this variable is measured at the state level, I obviously have much better 
measures of this independent variable for the Senate than for the House of 
Representatives. Nonetheless, I include a pooled analysis that includes the 
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House in order to examine whether the pattern identified in the Senate persists 
for the Congress as a whole.  
I include three control variables. Republican is the party affiliation of the 
member, with Republican coded as 1 and Democrat as zero. Ideology is measured 
using the main dimension from Poole and Rosenthal’s (2007) DW-NOMINATE 
scores. Presumably conservatives and Republicans will be more likely to favor 
patents, consistent with a generally pro-business outlook, and more pro-capital 
constituency interests. Manufacturing employment is measured as the percentage of 
the state workforce employed in manufacturing. Districts with interests in 
manufacturing may stand to benefit more from strong patents, and 
consequently may favor expanded patent rights.  
I focus my discussion and analysis on Senate votes. This is because the main 
independent variable and the dependent variable are both substantially better 
measured for the Senate. The district patenting variable is much more precisely 
measured for the Senate since data on the number of patents per person is 
readily available by state, but almost impossible to obtain by House district. 
Furthermore, whereas Senate votes cover a wide range of issues and are more 
evenly distributed across sessions, many of the 17 roll call votes taken in the 
House during the period I examine occurred during the mid 1990s and were 
the result of a complicated battle between different patent interests, pitting 
independent inventors against corporate patent owners. In the context of such 
an internecine fight, overall patent ownership is perhaps an unreliable guide to 
district interests, and determining which side to code as being in the interests 
of patent owners is difficult since patent owners themselves could not agree.4  
5. RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the results of a fixed-effect (by bill) logistic regression analysis of 
patent votes taken in the Senate and in the Congress as a whole. There is strong 
support for an influence of state-level patent holding on patent votes. Senators 
representing states with more patents per person (relative to the national mean) 
were substantially more likely to support expanded patent rights (p<.001), with a 
similar though somewhat weaker effect for the pooled analysis (p<.05) as would 
                                                 
4 I tended to code the “independent inventors” position as “pro-patent” since they opposed 
efforts to increase pre-printing of patents and otherwise sought to block changes that would 
have increased the openness of the patent system and made it easier to challenge patents, thereby 
arguably restricting the rents available to patent owners. Obviously this choice is debatable since 
other patent-owning interests took the opposite view. Given my coding choices, it is the 
distribution of independent inventors across states (rather than the distribution of all patent 
owners) that most strongly influences the House votes. Results for independent inventors are 
available by request from the author.  
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be expected given the much less precise measurement of district patenting 
interests for the House. In the Senate a shift from the sample minimum to the 
sample maximum (holding all other variables at their mean value) is associated 
with a shift in the predicted probability of a pro-patent vote from 44.1 percent to 
93.3 percent. Senators from districts with above average patenting are more likely 
to support making patents easier to acquire and defend. 
 
Table 1: Explaining Support for More Extensive Patent Protection 
in the U.S. Congress, 1965-2000 
 Senate Only House and Senate 
Patenting in state minus national 
mean  
2612 (778)*** 554 (243)** 
Republican 0.54 (0.29)* 0.21 (0.11)* 
Manufacturing Employment 
(percentage)  
0.008 (0.010) -0.002 (0.004) 
Ideology (Conservative) 3.27 (0.43)*** 1.01 (0.14)*** 
N-Observations 1051 7819 
N-Roll Calls 12 29 
LR Chi-squared (4) 294*** 383*** 
Note: Likelihood of a ‘pro-patent vote’ analyzed using conditional fixed-effects logistic 
regression. Standard error is in parentheses.  
     * indicates statistical significance at <.10 level.  
    ** indicates statistical significance at <.05 level. 
   *** indicates statistical significance at <.001 level. 
 
The analysis also provides some support for the idea that Republicans are more 
likely to cast pro-patent votes (p<0.10), and strong support for the idea that 
conservatives are more likely to cast pro-patent votes (p<0.001). Obviously party 
and ideology overlap, so it should be no surprise that if either variable is omitted 
from the analysis, the other has a large and statistically significant effect. 
Nonetheless, ideology rather than party appears to be the key influence.5  
                                                 
5 The effect of ideology on voting persists if Republicans are analyzed separately as well as if 
Democrats are analyzed separately, so ideology is clearly more than a simple proxy for party. In 
the absence of a control for member ideology, party membership has a strong and statistically 
significant effect (p<0.001). However, the model fits only slightly worse with party omitted in 
the Senate model (X 2 290), and much worse if ideology is omitted (X 2 230). Results are 
available by request.  
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6. EXPLAINING THE PRO-PATENT PERIOD  
The reforms and policy changes of the 1980s and 90s collectively made patents 
available for more subjects, increased the terms for which patents offered 
protection, and made patents both easier to get and easier to defend in the 
United States. These reforms took effect during a period that the model 
predicts would be characterized by increased legislative support for patents.  
As noted above, if representatives believe that particular increases in patent 
protection provide public benefits through increased innovation, then even 
representatives from states with modestly below-average patent portfolios 
might cast pro-patent votes. How ‘much’ faith in the efficacy of stronger 
patents would be required to motivate the median Senator or Representative to 
support strengthened IP protection?  
Figure 1 examines changes in the difference between the number of patents 
per person held in the mean state, and the number per person in the median 
state. As the median state gains patents relative to the mean state, 
representatives from this state are more likely to support expanded patent 
protections: the degree of public good done by patents needed to persuade 
Senators and Representatives from that state gets progressively smaller. 
 
Figure 1: Mean minus Median Patents per Person Across States 



















passage of major 
expansions of 
patent rights. 
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It happens that the distance between mean and median patenting across the 
states neatly demarcates the boundaries of the pro-patent era of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Figure 1 shows that the distance between the mean and median 
levels of patenting was halved between the early 1970s and the early 1980s.  
In the Congress that oversaw Nixon’s resignation (1973-1974) the mean state 
had 1 patent per 10,000 persons more than the median state. By the 98th 
Congress (1983-1984), the mean state had only 1 patent per 20,000 people 
more than the median state. The move to a stronger patent system occurred at 
a time when stronger patents, even patents granted for goods with fewer public 
benefits, had become more appealing to more Senators. By the early 1980s, the 
distributive consequences of patents were much less of a bar to Senate action.6  
Figure 1 also marks the upper boundary of the pro-patent era. The relatively 
pro-patent political situation began to reverse during the 103rd Congress (1993-
1994). By the 107th Congress (2001-2002) the gap between the median and 
mean state had expanded to the point where it was wider than at any time since 
the mid 1970s. This suggests that tolerance for inefficiencies in the patent 
system was waning. It is likely no surprise that no major legislation expanding 
patent protections passed Congress after the 103rd Congress, and much 
subsequent political debate focused on ways to increase the efficacy of the 
patent system − at supplying public goods and restricting the availability and 
enforceability of patent rights.7  
                                                 
6 If each member of the House is assigned their state’s average number of patents per person, a 
similar graphic to that in Figure 1 (available by request) indicates an inclination on the part of the 
House to support even some patent policies that provided negative public goods until the late 1990s.  
7 By the 109th Congress, patent reform proposals had a decidedly pro-efficiency bent: if passed 
they would have produced less enforceable, higher quality (i.e. harder to get) patents. HR 2795, 
proposed by Lamar Smith, chair of the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property 
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, and SB 3818 introduced by Senators Hatch 
and Leahy sought to restrict the size of damage awards for patent infringement, create post-grant 
opportunities to contest the validity of issued patents, expand prior user rights, and allow third 
parties to submit prior art after patent applications are printed. In line with the changing mood, 
the Supreme Court has signaled that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit would no 
longer have unbounded authority to set patent policy. In the October 2006 term, the court heard 
several patent cases, including KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., a case challenging the 
obviousness standards established by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 
(Greenhouse, 2006). In eBay v. MercExchange (2006), a unanimous Supreme Court substantially 
reduced the ability of patent owners to obtain injunctions against accused infringers. The 1999 
Inventors Protection Act was also arguably a loss for patent owners, since it meant that many 
patent applications would be disclosed to the public before the patent had issued. Perhaps 
significantly, this weakening of intellectual property protection was favored by many of the 
patent and IP lobbying groups because they believed that disclosure (particularly of foreign 
patents in English) would provide a public good. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented in this article suggests that members of Congress were 
in fact representing their constituents’ shifting interests when they 
strengthened patent policies in the 1980s and early 1990s. The shifting 
geographical distribution of patent ownership in the United States gave 
members of Congress an incentive to support both stronger returns for patent 
owners, and increased availability of patents, even if these reforms provided 
relatively few public goods. The patent system in the United States changed as 
the political incentives faced by politicians in the U.S. Congress made them 
more likely to support such changes. When those interests began to reverse, so 
did U.S. public policy towards patents.  
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